AIRBUS

A320 FAMILY

Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

May 2025

Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes Included since May 2025

The main FCOM / QRH / FCTM changes described in this document will be available in the Operator FCOM / QRH / FCTM manuals, based on the Operator's revision cycle.

0. Issue and Reasons for Update

Issue n°	Date	Reason for Update
1	19 May 2025	Initial Issue

1. [FCTM] - Update of the Fuel Leak Chapter

1.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCTM
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / Fuel / Fuel Leak.*

1.2. Summary of the Modifications

The Fuel Leak chapter is updated for better clarity. It includes an illustration explaining the fuel leak management philosophy.

2. [FCTM] - Engine Fire Emergency Procedure

2.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCTM
  - Introduction of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / ENG / ENG FIRE.*

2.2. Summary of the Modifications

A new chapter about the engine fire procedure is introduced in the Abnormal and Emergency Procedures section. This new chapter provides specific recommendations to clarify how to handle the ENG 1(2) FIRE alert.

3. [LIM] - New Limitation on Avionics Ventilation

3.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of *Limitations / Air Bleed / Cond / Press /Vent / Avionics Ventilation.*

3.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with dual speed capability for the avionics fans (MOD/MP 30292/P6567).

3.3. Summary of the Modifications

The dual speed capability for the avionics ventilation system is optional.

The avionics fans are set to low speed if the temperature of the air that blows is below 40 °C, and to high speed if the air temperature is above 40 °C.

A failure of the dual speed capability could leave the fans running at low speed. In this case, less airflow will be available in the avionics bay, which may have a negative effect on the avionics equipment, particularly in high OATs. As a result, new temperature limitations are provided in the FCOM for the electrical supply of the avionics bay.

4. [QRH] - Removal of the "IMPORTANT" Chapter from the QRH

4.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Removal of the chapter */ General / Important*.

4.2. Summary of the Modifications

The chapter named "Important" in the QRH contained some information that is not for a direct operational use: Information related to the application of the abnormal procedures and definitions.
All this information is related to the Airbus Operating Philosophy and is already available in the FCTM and the FCOM. This chapter is removed from the QRH because the QRH is for a direct operational use on-board.
This chapter was already not available in the eQRH.

5. [RESET] - New Reset Procedure on Ground for Engine Fire Detection Unit

5.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / System Reset*

5.2. Summary of the Modifications

Addition of new reset procedures in the case of:
- ENG 1(2) FIRE DET FAULT
- ENG 1(2) FIRE LOOP A(B) FAULT.

These procedures are only applicable on ground.

6. [RESET] - Extension of the MMR Reset to Additional MMR Models, and Reset Conditions Update in the Reset Table

6.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / [RESET] SYSTEM RESET / System Reset Table*
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / [RESET] SYSTEM RESET*

6.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with the following MMRs:

- Honeywell RMA-55B, iMMR
- Thales TLS-755
- Collins GLU-920 and GLU-925

6.3. Summary of the Modifications

The MMR reset procedure is extended to additional MMR models (Honeywell RMA-55B, iMMR and Thales TLS-755), in accordance with supplier recommendations.

The following new reset conditions are introduced:

- GPS data dashed on MCDU page GPS MONITOR
- NAV ADS-B RPTG FAULT for aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out standard DO-260B.

Note: The MMR reset procedure is not extended to MMR Collins GLU-2100, because the cockpit reset is not successful against the known locking conditions for this computer. Refer to ISI article 34.36.00068 *COLLINS AEROSPACE - GLU-2100 (P/N: 822-2532-300) - Lock-up events*.

7. [RESET] - Addition of a New MMR Reset for NAV FLS FAULT

7.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / System Reset Table / NAV - MMR RESET.*
  - Introduction of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / [RESET] SYSTEM RESET / NAV FLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT.*

7.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with MMR Collins GLU-2100 std L4.1, or L4.2 and FMS Honeywell H3 or H4 or H5.

7.3. Summary of the Modifications

Introduction of a new MMR reset procedure in the case of NAV FLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT alert.

Due to a misbehavior of MMR GLU-2100, the FLS function may be lost on one or both sides (CAPT and/or F/O) below 700 ft.

If the flight crew decides to fly the next approach with the FLS guidance mode, the MMR reset allows the recovery of FLS function.

The following ISI article 34.36.00067 *COLLINS AEROSPACE - GLU-2100 (P/N: 822-2532-300) - FLS COM-MON Feedback issue* describes this misbehavior.

8. [RESET] - Introduction of GPSSU Reset

8.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Introduction of *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / System Reset Table.*
  - Introduction of *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / System Reset.*

8.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with GPSSU (GPS stand-alone receivers).

8.3. Summary of the Modifications

Introduction of the GPSSU reset to manage the effects of GPS interference that persists on GPSSU computers.

9. [RESET] - New Reset Procedure on Ground for Power Transfer Unit

9.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / System Reset*.
- FCOM
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / HYD / HYD PTU FAULT*.

9.2. Summary of the Modifications

The reset of the PTU was included in the FCOM HYD PTU FAULT abnormal procedure. This reset procedure is now introduced in the QRH, in the case of HYD PTU FAULT, and removed from the FCOM.

10. [RESET] - New Reset Procedure on Ground for Printer Malfunction

10.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / System Reset* section.

10.2. Summary of the Modifications

- QRH
  - Addition of a new reset procedure in the case of printer malfunction. This procedure is only applicable on ground.

11. [SUP] - Update of the GPS Interference Procedure

11.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of *Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / GPS Interference.*

11.2. Summary of the Modifications

The supplementary procedure related to GPS interference is updated to include the new known effects that may be seen in service:

- ALTSM: Spurious “ALTIMETER SETTING” alert
- GLS, FLS, SLS: The deviations may be incorrect.
- ROW/ROPS: Spurious messages and aural alerts
- SATCOM: SATCOM loss
- WXR: Erroneous WXR information may be displayed on the ND for aircraft equipped with WXR Honeywell RDR-4000 or Collins WXR-2100A.
- New effects that may persist after the interference area depending on the GPS receiver model installed on aircraft.

This update also provides new guidance, to manage some of the operational effects of GPS interference:

- Procedure adaptation for aircraft not equipped with a GPS clock.
- Procedure adaptation for aircraft equipped with a stand-alone GPS receiver (GPSSU).
- Update of the section “Within the interference area”:
  - Introduction of considerations for ROW/ROPS handling, if spoofing is expected during approach.
  - Introduction of recommendations for approaches at locations affected by spoofing.
- Update of the section “After the interference area”:
  - Update of the recommendations related to possible effects that may persist, customized per GPS receiver installed on aircraft .
  - Extension of the MMR reset possibility to all MMR models except for Collins GLU-2100, for which the reset is not advantageous (refer to ISI 34.36.00068 COLLINS AEROSPACE - GLU-2100 (P/N: 822-2532-300) - Lock-up events for additional information).
  - Introduction of the GPSSU possibility for aircrafts equipped with stand-alone GPS receivers.
- Update of the section “Parking”: Addition of a note to make it clear that when the GPS is deselected on the FMS before the aircraft is affected by spoofing, this prevents an IRS drift display that is abnormal on the ND.

12. Flight Crew Actions in the Case of Loss of Datalink Communication Means

12.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Information Systems / Datalink / How To / How to Manage Temporary Loss of Datalink Communication Means*.
- QRH
  - Update of *Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / [RESET] SYSTEM RESET / DATALINK ATSU Malfunction*.

12.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with ATSU.

12.3. Summary of the Modifications

In-service feedback indicates that flight crews do not correctly detect the difference between a loss of datalink communication means and an ATSU equipment failure. This causes flight crews to attempt ATSU resets too frequently.

When the datalink communication malfunction comes from the loss of datalink communication means, an ATSU reset is not appropriate and may result in other system misbehaviors if performed too frequently (Refer to TFU 46.21.00128).

The System Reset Table is updated with a note, to clarify that an ATSU reset must not be attempted if the loss of datalink communications is due to a loss of datalink communication means. The note also provides the associated cockpit indication in this situation.

Also, the chapter "How to Manage Temporary Loss of Datalink Connection" is now referred to as "How to Manage Temporary Loss of Datalink Communication Means", in order to be in line with the wording used in the QRH System Reset Table. In addition, before this update, the description was only included for aircraft with ATSU standard CSB9 and subsequent. Now, the description is also included for previous ATSU standards, in order to provide guidance to all flight crews in this situation.

13. [SUP] - Update of the Engine Ice Shedding Procedure

13.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM:
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Adverse Weather / Engine Operations On Ground In Icing Conditions.*

13.2. Applicability

A320 Family equipped with CFM56 engines

13.3. Summary of the Modifications

The purpose of the update of the Engine Ice Shedding on Ground procedure is to:

- Add a description in the Preliminary Cockpit Preparation phase, to make clear when the Taxi-In time and the Taxi-Out time begin, and when they finish.
- Add a Caution in the Takeoff phase, in order to remark that as for Taxi-Out and for Taxi-In, during the last engine acceleration, the thrust setting and the hold time should be as high as possible up to 70 % N1.
- Enhance the content in the Before Takeoff phase, in order to emphasize that the final engine acceleration before takeoff must be performed, regardless of any engine acceleration performed during the Taxi-Out phase.
- Enhance the content in the Before Takeoff phase, in order to better explain that the last engine acceleration can also be performed just before line-up.

14. [ABN] - EMER DESCENT - Oxygen Masks Drop-Down

14.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCTM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / MISC / Emer Descent*.

14.2. Summary of the Modifications

Following in-service events, Airbus decided to enhance the flight crew awareness about the oxygen mask deployment in the cabin. The oxygen masks deploy in the case of cabin depressurization based on an independent switch that monitors the cabin pressure. This cabin pressure switch is different from the pressure sensor of the Cabin Pressure Controllers (CPCs) that triggers the CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT alert. Therefore, the flight crew must consider the deployment of the oxygen masks in the cabin as a sign of depressurization and a trigger to initiate an emergency descent.

However, this should be considered when all oxygen masks deploy and not in the case of partial deployment of the oxygen masks. Partial deployment of oxygen masks in the cabin are due to mechanical failures and not depressurization.

In addition, a note reminds the flight crew that the cabin crew will notify them if the oxygen masks drop down in the cabin. This is required by the CCOM procedure but may not be known by the flight crew.

15. [ABN] - Update of the EMER ELEC CONFIG

15.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / Elec /* [QRH] *Elec Emer Config SYS Remaining.*
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Ice and Rain Protection / Engine Anti-Ice Description.*
- QRH
  - Update of *the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures* / Elec / *Elec Emer Config SYS Remaining*

15.2. Summary of the Modifications

The ELEC EMER CONFIG SYS REMAINING table is updated in order to take into account the behavior of the Pressure Regulating & Shut off Valves (PRSOVs) for the A320neo aircraft.

On A320neo, in the case of ELEC EMER CONFIG, the PRSOVs remain operational and can still be controlled via the ENG ANTI ICE pb-sw. This is because the Electronic Engine Computer (EEC) remains available and still sends the status of the ENG ANTI ICE pb-sw (control of the PRSOVs) to the FWS.

The ENG A.ICE ECAM memo indication remains available. The status of the PRSOVs in NORM in the case of an ELEC EMER CONFIG.

The FCOM description of the engine anti-ice function is also updated to take into account the different behavior of the PRSOVs between the A320neo and A320ceo versions.

16. [ABN] - QRH Display Unit Failure

16.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of the Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / EIS / [QRH] DISPLAY UNIT FAILURE
- FCOM
  - Update of the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / EIS / [QRH] DISPLAY UNIT FAILURE

16.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with EIS1.

16.3. Summary of the Modifications

The update of the procedure includes the specific case of a diagonal line (failure) on the ND. The purpose is to enable the recovery of the Display Unit in the following cases:

- The failure results from the attempt to display an excessive number of waypoints
- There is a constraint with an excessive number of characters.

17. [ABN] - Altitude Limitation in ELEC EMER CONFIG and DUAL HYDRAULIC Failures Summaries

17.1. Effect on the Manuals

- QRH
  - Update of the *Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / ELEC EMER CONFIG Summary / CRUISE*
  - Update of the *Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / HYD G+B SYS LO PR Summary / CRUISE*
  - Update of the *Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / HYD G+Y SYS LO PR Summary / CRUISE*.

17.2. Applicability

Applicable to A319/A320/A321 aircraft

17.3. Summary of the Modifications

In degraded law, the flight domain becomes larger in speed and AoA when flying below the recommended maximum altitude.

For safety enhancement, the ELEC EMER CONFIG, HYD G+B SYS LO PR and HYD G+Y SYS LO PR summaries are updated, in order to reduce the maximum flight level to 4 000 ft below the recommended maximum FL.

This modification is included on ECAM in the F/CTL ALTN LAW, F/CTL DIRECT LAW alerts and associated procedures with the FWC H2-F15 standard.

18. [DSC] - Check of the Shoulder Harness Correct Installation on the Third Occupant Seat

18.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Equipment / Flight Deck / Seats / Observer Seat Adjustment*

18.2. Summary of the Modifications

Airbus received several reports that the shoulder harness on the third occupant seat was not correctly installed. This problem may happen when the headrest is folded in the stowed position.

A check is included as a warning, to ensure that the shoulder harness is correctly installed when the headrest is unfolded.

For additional information, refer to ISI article 25.11.00030 and OIT 999.0078/24.